1. The paradox of generics
Generics are both more and less powerful than universals. They are more powerful, because they are lawlike : (1a) may be true as a contingent fact, but (1b) will not be true unless a law is enacted, requiring Supreme Court judges to have a prime Social Security number.
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(1) |
a. All Supreme Court judges have a prime Social Security number. |
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b. Supreme Court judges have a prime Social Security number. |
But generics are also less powerful than universals, because they tolerate exceptions : (2a) is false, while (2b) is true.
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(2) |
a. All birds fly. |
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b. Birds fly. |
This paradox seems to be at the core of the problem of genericity. How can we solve it ?
To solve the first problem, it is often proposed that generics are modal (Dahl 1975). Thus, (1a) is about actual Supreme Court judges, but (1b) is about possible Supreme Court judges. This is why (1a), but not (1b), can hold of a temporary, contingent generalization. But if generics are modal, what sort of modals are they ?
In th...