1. Introduction
It is a remarkable fact about human cognition that despite the fact that we encounter only particular entities, we generally think and speak of them as instances of one or another kind (e.g. a dog, a tree, a table). Furthermore, we are able to think and talk about the kinds as such. Thus the statements in (1-3) are interpreted generically and are understood to characterize various kinds of things.
|
(1) |
Dinosaurs are extinct. |
|
(2) |
Ducks lay eggs. |
|
(3) |
Mosquitos carry malaria. |
Recent research suggests that children appear to use noun phrases both generically and non-generically to talk about kinds as well as instances of kinds right from the start (Pappas & Gelman, 1998; Gelman & Tardif, 1998; Goldin-Meadow, Mylander & Gelman, 2005; Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka & Flukes, 2008), suggesting the capacity to make generic and non-generic reference are closely tied in development. These simple facts raise a host of important questions concerning the conceptual capa...